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Conformity and State Income Taxes: Suggestions for the Crisis
by Michael A. Livingston and David Gamage
Michael A. Livingston is a professor at
Rutgers Law School and David Gamage is a
professor at Indiana University Maurer School
of Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors explain how and why
state governments should evaluate their degree
of conformity with federal tax changes.
To guarantee adequate revenue in the postCOVID-19 era, state governments should
consider using all possible tools at their disposal.
This article explains how and why state
governments should evaluate their degree of
conformity with federal tax changes in order to
achieve this purpose. We recommend that state
governments consider:
• Adopting either a static or selective
conformity that enables the state to choose
the federal tax changes it is adopting, rather
than automatically adopting all changes. In
most cases, in the current crisis conditions,
this should primarily involve accepting
revenue-enhancing provisions and
rejecting those that reduce revenue.
• Rejecting or postponing conformity to
several changes contained in the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act, including changes to
the business interest deduction rules
(section 163), net operating losses (section
172), charitable deductions (section 170),
and several employer-related provisions,
most of which are revenue losers.
• Adopting, if they have not done so already,
the revenue-enhancing provisions of the
global intangible low-taxed income rules,
originally contained in the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017. (One of us has written on
this topic in several prior essays —
coauthored with Darien Shanske — so we

will not repeat the details of this
recommendation here.1)
The remainder of this article provides
background and elaboration regarding the
suggestions above. This essay is a contribution to
Project SAFE: State Action in Fiscal
2
Emergencies.
General Background Discussion
Conformity3 relates to state governments’
practice of piggybacking on the federal income
tax in designing state-level tax bases. All states
with income taxes practice conformity to some
degree, but the degree is important, especially in
a period of rapid tax changes. When state
revenues are in peril, as they are in every state in
the COVID-19 era, these differences become
especially significant.
One of the principal issues here is the
question of static or dynamic conformity.
Imagine that the federal government decides that
beginning in 2018, previously depreciable
expenditures are now currently expensed or
depreciated on a faster schedule. A state
practicing dynamic conformity would
automatically enact the same change for its 2018
returns. By contrast, a state practicing static
conformity might say that it conformed to the
federal system as of 2015, or even 2000, leaving
for itself the choice of whether to enact the

1

E.g., Darien Shanske and David Gamage, “States Should Conform to
GILTI, Part 3: Elevator Pitch and Q&A,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 14, 2019, p.
121; and Shanske and Gamage, “Why States Can Tax the GILTI,” State
Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967.
2

See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
3

For a more comprehensive treatment of the theory and practice of
conformity, see Ruth Mason, “Delegating Up: State Conformity With the
Federal Tax Base,” 62 Duke L.J. 1267 (2013). For more detailed treatment
of conformity and the COVID-19 crisis, see Adam Thimmesch, “Taking
Control of the State Tax Base During the Pandemic” (May 11, 2020).
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change above. In this example, the state’s
revenue would be correspondingly higher.
Of course, when Congress expands the
federal tax base, the effect is the opposite. Take,
for example, the 2017 GILTI rules, which reduce
tax evasion accomplished by transfer of
intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions. A state
practicing dynamic conformity would most
likely put in place a similar rule regarding 2018
returns. But a state that preferred static
conformity would not: Unless it enacted new
legislation, it would remain tied to old law, and
continue to permit the (now federally
impermissible) tax evasion. In this case, the static
rule would reduce revenue.
A third possibility is for a state to practice
selective conformity, adopting only those federal
tax changes it wishes to and ignoring the others.
This is implicit in the static method described
above, but the state may also choose it explicitly.
Like many things in tax — or life — the
playing field for state conformity is somewhat
arbitrary in practice, reflecting historical
circumstance more than a consistent logical
pattern. For instance, according to a recent Tax
Foundation report, 19 states have adopted static
conformity regarding individual tax provisions,
18 have adopted “rolling” (dynamic) conformity,
and only four selective conformity, with a
handful of states not fitting perfectly into any
4
single category. Since the TCJA broadened the
tax base, while reducing tax rates, the rolling or
dynamic states (which in theory benefit from
base broadening while still setting their own
independent tax rates) would in this case come
off better than those using a static model. But this
conclusion relies on many assumptions,
including the effect of the 2017 changes on
personal exemptions and the standard
deduction (which show up in taxable income but
not adjusted gross income) and state conformity
to changes in federal business tax provisions.
States using selective conformity would have the
best deal of all, assuming that they chose to
embrace the revenue-enhancing provisions but

4

5

Jared Walczak, “Toward a State of Conformity: State Tax Codes a
Year After Federal Tax Reform,” Tax Foundation: Fiscal Fact No. 631
(Jan. 2019), at 7.
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not the revenue losers, although this is not
always politically possible.
For states seeking new revenues — as many
will be in the post-COVID-19 era — it would
seem logical to adopt a selective approach (at
least for the duration of the crisis), allowing them
to follow changes that add revenue and avoid
those with the opposite effect. There is
admittedly a problem here in that it is hard to
predict the nature and extent of federal tax
changes. Like states, the federal government
faces conflicting pressures, needing revenue
enhancers to offset the losses resulting from
COVID-19 but at the same time coming under
enormous pressure to offer individual and
corporate tax relief. A selective approach would
allow a state to hedge its bets, metaphorically
speaking, rather than adopt all federal changes
(dynamic conformity) or presumptively reject
them (static conformity).
An especially important element to all this is
that state governments face very different policy
constraints during economic downturns
compared with the federal government. In
particular, state governments face balanced
budget constraints; they generally have to either
raise tax revenues or enact painful spending cuts
during economic downturns.5 By contrast,
lacking such constraints, it is often good policy
for the federal government to increase deficit
spending during economic downturns and to
give up tax revenue, thus taking less from
private sector actors. Lacking this option, or
facing much more stringent constraints on the
option to borrow or deficit spend, state
governments should generally prioritize raising
revenues from economic actors with greater
ability to pay (and to endure the economic
downturn) over cutting spending programs
needed either by those less able to endure the
downturn or to minimize damage to state
6
economies.
Consider again a hypothetical federal
government shift from depreciation to full
expensing. A federal policy change of this sort
might well be a prudent federal-level response to

Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).
6

Id.
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the economic downturn because it would reduce
federal revenue while providing more funds and
incentives for private sector businesses engaged
in investment. But the downsides of such a
policy change would be much higher if applied
to state-level income taxes because the state
governments cannot so easily deficit spend. This
is thus a prime example of the sort of federal
policy change that the state governments should
probably not conform to during an economic
downturn, despite this policy arguably being
desirable regarding the federal tax laws.

their early shrunken revenues if they don’t.
States in need of more revenue should consider
rejecting all these changes, particularly as they
tend to affect primarily wealthier taxpayers and
are likely to be largely invisible to the average
voter. Refusing to adopt these changes would
appear to involve fewer political risks than, say,
a divergence from the PPP rules.


Some Further Details
An immediate conformity problem presents
itself in connection with the CARES Act, enacted
this spring. The most visible example concerns
the tax status of economic impact payments
(EIPs) (“stimulus”) as well as loans provided
under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) of
the Small Business Administration, which help
businesses meet payroll in the COVID-19 crisis.
Federal law provides that EIPs are tax free and
that the cancellation of loans made under the
PPP is likewise exempt from tax. It seems
unlikely any state would tax EIPs, except
perhaps in extraordinary cases. But the PPP rules
are a little bit more complex, providing that
cancellation of the loans will not be taxable
under section 61(a)(12) but lacking clarity about
the extent to which related interest payments
will be nondeductible under section 265, which
prohibits deductions related to tax-exempt
7
income. There may accordingly be room for
states to take a more assertive position in this
area.
The CARES Act also makes other temporary
and permanent amendments to the federal tax
laws, including changes to business interest
deduction rules (section 163), NOLs (section
172), charitable deductions (section 170), and
several employer-related provisions, most of
which are (understandably) of a pro-taxpayer,
revenue-reducing variety. These provisions put
states in a more difficult position, making them
appear heartless to taxpayers if they do not
conform to the new rules, but further reducing

7

See IRS Notice 2020-32, 2020-21 IRB 837 (Apr. 30, 2020).
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